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ARTICLE
THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT: A
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
JOHN H. MATHESON*
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act was enacted in 1974 as (1) a consumer
protection statute designed to provide accurate information to and about
consumers involved in credit transactions, and (2) an antidiscrimination
statute designed to shield protected classes of consumers from discrimi-
nation in the granting of credit. The Federal Reserve Board promulgated
regulations to further these statutory goals. Congress intended that the
Act would be enforced through both private litigation and public compli-
ance programs. Few private lawsuits have been brought under the Act,
however, and public enforcement efforts have neither checked credit dis-
crimination nor halted perpetuation of prior discrimination.
Professor Matheson believes that courts, government enforcement
agencies, and consumers should focus on substantive (rather than pro-
cedural) violations of the Act and its implementing regulations. The Act
should be amended to allow for a minimum damage recovery for successful
plaintiffs. The definition of "adverse action" in the regulations should be
amended to acknowledge that credit granted on different terms than those
requested by an applicant may indicate illegal discrimination. Detailed
statistical information must be kept by credit-granting institutions and
made available to private litigants and government enforcement agencies
to assist them in identifying and eliminating credit discrimination. Profes-
sor Matheson believes that these changes will help create a statutory and
regulatory framework that will promote better compliance by creditors
with the Act's provisions and enhance enforcement efforts by both private
parties and public agencies.
In 1974, Congress passed the Equal Credit Opportunity Act'
(hereinafter ECOA or the Act) to ensure that "financial institu-
tions and other firms engaged in the extension of credit make
that credit equally available to all creditworthy customers with-
out regard to sex or marital status."'2 Two years later, Congress
expanded the ECOA to prohibit credit discrimination based on
race, color, national origin, age, receipt of public assistance
income, or the exercise in good faith of the rights guaranteed
under the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The ECOA was
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.S., Illinois State Univer-
sity, 1974; J.D., Northwestern University, 1977. I would like to thank Steve H. Nickles
for his encouragement and assistance. Daniel Solomon, University of Minnesota Law
School, Class of 1985, and Sheryl Walter, University of Minnesota Law School, Class
of 1984, provided able research assistance.
IEqual Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, §§ 501-503, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982)).
2 Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 502, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974).
3 Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, §§ 1-8, 90
Stat. 251 (1976) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1982)).
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instantly hailed as a watershed in the battle to provide knowl-
edge about and accessibility to credit. 4
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act serves two purposes. 5
First, like other credit legislation such as the Truth in Lending
Act 6 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 7 the ECOA is a con-
sumer protection statute designed to provide accurate informa-
tion to or about consumers involved in credit transactions. Sec-
ond, the ECOA is an antidiscrimination statute like the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act.s The ECOA assumes that con-
sumer credit is a positive and necessary aspect of our economy
to which all qualified applicants should have equal access; 9 com-
pliance with the procedural directives of ECOA does not always
guarantee freedom from liability, unlike compliance with the
provisions of the Truth in Lending Act.'
This Article demonstrates how the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, through a combination of its explicit provisions and unper-
ceived flaws, has been a functional failure in combating credit
discrimination. Part I presents a brief overview of the statute
and its implementing regulation. Part II examines the Act's dual
enforcement mechanism of public compliance programs and pri-
I See, e.g., Note, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976: A Mean-
ingfiul Step Toward the Elimination of Credit Discrimination, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 149
(1976); Comment, Equal Credit for All--An Analysis of the 1976 Amendments to the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 326 (1978).
1 See Equal Credit Opportunity, 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 101 (1977).
6 15 U.SC. §§ 1601-1667 (1982).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1690 (1982).
s Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
9
Credit has ceased to be a luxury item, either for consumers or for business
entrepreneurs. Consumer credit outstanding continues to grow at a phenomenal
pace and now stands slightly below $200 billion, not even counting 1-4 family
mortgage credit which would add more than $400 billion to that total. Virtually
all home purchases are made on credit. About two-thirds of consumer auto-
mobile purchases are on an installment basis. Large department stores report
that 50% or more of their sales are on revolving or closed-end credit plans.
Upwards of 15% of all consumer disposable income is devoted to credit obli-
gations other than home mortgages.
In this circumstance the Committee believes it must be established as clear
national policy that no credit applicant shall be denied the credit he or she
needs and wants on the basis of characteristics that have nothing to do with
his or her creditworthiness. The Committee readily acknowledges that irra-
tional discrimination is not in the creditor's own best interests because it means
he is losing a potentially valuable and creditworthy customer. But, despite this
logical truth, the hearing record is replete with examples of refusals to extend
or to continue credit arrangements for applicants falling within one or more of
the categories addressed by this bill.
S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 403, 405.
10 See 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1982).
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vate litigation. The dearth of private lawsuits brought under the
Act and reasons for their absence is examined in Part III. Part
IV describes how public enforcement efforts under the Act have
neither acted as an independent check on discrimination nor
provided the impetus to halt perpetuation of prior discrimina-
tion. Part V considers several fundamental policy issues affected
by the ECOA that to date have escaped judicial consideration.
Finally, Part VI suggests several amendments needed to institute
effective enforcement of the Act.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ACT AND REGULATION B
Credit has become a functional substitute for cash in our
economy, and consequently credit decisions can greatly influ-
ence an individual's economic choices. The Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act was adopted after a study revealed that creditors,
including banks, credit card issuers, credit unions, and small
businesses, were unjustly denying credit to members of certain
groups, such as racial minorities and women." The ECOA at-
tempts to lessen some of the private sector's control over indi-
vidual purchasing power by seeking to correct the inaccurate
use of stereotypes and to promote wider availability of credit
by prohibiting use of those stereotypes in credit decisions.' 2
The statute and its implementing Regulation B cover all
phases of a credit transaction. 13 Regulation B identifies and
11 NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED
STATES 151-53 (1972).
12 The general rule and fundamental proscription of the ECOA's implementing regu-
lation is that "[a] creditor shall not discriminate against an applicant on a prohibited
basis regarding any aspect of a credit transaction." 12 C.F.R. § 202.4 (1983). The critical
terms are defined in the Act or in the regulations, including "discriminate," which is
defined as "to treat an applicant less favorably than other applicants." Id. § 202.2(n).
," 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(m) (1983). The transaction, however, must involve "credit,"
which is defined as "the right granted by a creditor ... to defer payment of a debt,
incur debt and defer its payment, or purchase property or services and defer payment
therefor." 12 C.F.R. § 202.20) (1983). "Creditor" is defined in Regulation B as
A person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in the
decision of whether or not to extend credit. The term includes a creditor's
assignee, transferee, or subrogee who so participates. For purposes of §§ 202.4
and 202.5(a), the term also includes a person who, in the ordinary course of
business, regularly refers applicants or prospective applicants to creditors, or
selects or offers to select creditors to whom requests for credit may be made.
A person is not a creditor regarding any violation of the Act or this part
committed by another creditor unless the person knew or had reasonable notice
of the act, policy, or practice that constituted the violation before its involve-
ment with the credit transaction. The term does not include a person whose
only participation in a credit transaction involves honoring a credit card.
12 C.F.R. § 202.2(1) (1983).
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addresses in detail various phases of the credit-granting proce-
dure, with particular focus on the application process, the eval-
uation process, and the reporting of reasons for adverse action. 14
Regulation B prohibits a creditor from requesting any informa-
tion with respect to certain applicant characteristics. 5 By lim-
14 Several classes of transactions are exempted from many of Regulation B's proce-
dural and technical restrictions on the credit process. Section 202.3 lists these exemp-
tions, which include credit relating to public utilities, securities transactions, incidental
consumer credit, extensions of credit primarily for business or commercial purposes,
and governmental credit. 12 C.F.R. § 202.3(a)-(f) (1983). Though these areas remain
susceptible to the general ban on discrimination in § 202.4, § 202.3 effectively provides
that unsuccessful credit applicants can bring suit for technical violations of the Act only
in cases involving individual consumer credit.
Is 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d) (1983). Problems arise when the regulations allow the same
information to be used for one purpose, yet attempt to restrict its use for another
purpose. It is relatively easy to preclude use of race in a credit determination when the
creditor has no information about an applicant's race. It is much more difficult to control
the use of that information once it has been obtained. Regulation B somewhat wishfully
provides that a creditor may consider in evaluating an application any information that
the creditor obtains as long as that information is not used to discriminate against an
applicant on a prohibited basis. For example, a creditor is prohibited from asking an
applicant's race for purposes of credit evaluation, id. § 202.5(d)(5), but is required to
obtain information concerning race in certain transactions for purposes of monitoring
the Act's effectiveness. Id. §§ 202.5(b)(2), 202.13(a). Although a credit-evaluation in-
quiry into race is prohibited, id. § 202.5(d)(5), that same provision allows inquiry into
the applicant's immigration status. Most strikingly, although the Act declares that age
discrimination is unlawful, it permits a creditor to consider the age of an elderly appli-
cant, if the applicant's age is used by the creditor in the applicant's favor. Id.
§ 202.6(b)(2)(iv).
A creditor may not inquire into an applicant's sex, id. § 202.5(d)(3); it may, however,
indirectly obtain information regarding an applicant's sex from the applicant's first name
or the applicant's use of an optional title such as Ms. or Mrs. Information about birth
control practices or intent to bear children may not be elicited, but a creditor may
request the number of an applicant's dependents. Id. § 202.5(d)(4). A creditor may
request an applicant's marital status only if the application is for other than individual
unsecured credit. Id. § 202.5(d)(1). A creditor may not inquire into whether an appli-
cant's income is derived from alimony, child support or separate maintenance, unless
the applicant is informed that such income need not be revealed and the applicant wants
it to be considered in determining creditworthiness. Id. § 202.5(d)(2). As a practical
matter, a woman who receives sporadic alimony or child support payments may be
caught between conflicting implications of the Act. If she asks the creditor to consider
this income, she may be denied credit because of another's history of irregular payment
or poor credit rating rather than because of her own character and capacity to repay.
Yet, if she chooses to withhold information regarding these payments from the creditor,
she risks being denied credit because of insufficient income.
Sometimes the specific rules in the regulations concerning use of information establish
subtle distinctions between permissible and impermissible uses of the same information.
For example, a creditor cannot take into account the existence of a telephone listing in
the applicant's name, but can consider whether there is a telephone in the applicant's
home. Id. § 202.6(b)(4). Part-time income and support payments cannot be disregarded,
but the creditor may subjectively determine the likelihood that such income will con-
tinue. Id. § 202.6(b)(5). These distinctions isolate and ban creditor practices that, in the
instances cited above, tend to discriminate against women whose phone is listed in their
husband's name, who can only work part-time because of family obligations, or who
have little control over the regularity with which they receive support payments. Such
subtlety, however, may work against Regulation B's objective of clarifying what is
acceptable creditor behavior in application evaluation.
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iting the collection of this information, Regulation B aims to
prevent creditors from basing credit decisions on improper
assumptions.
Regulation B is also designed to assist applicants in identifying
and enforcing their rights. A creditor has an affirmative duty to
inform an unsuccessful applicant of her right to request a state-
ment of the reasons she was denied credit, and to furnish those
reasons to the applicant upon her request. 16 The creditor must
also provide the applicant with a statement of the ECOA's
purpose and the name of the governmental agency that enforces
the Act in that particular transaction.17
II. THE DUAL ENFORCEMENT MODEL
The ECOA employs a dual enforcement model in seeking to
achieve its goal of ensuring the widest possible access to credit.
Compliance with the ECOA is enforced both by government
agencies and through private litigation. The Act authorizes the
Federal Reserve Board to prescribe regulations to clarify and
amplify specific statutory provisions in light of its legislative
purpose, 18 although overall administrative enforcement of the
Act rests with the Federal Trade Commission, with limited au-
thority delegated to eleven other federal agencies.19
16 12 C.F.R. § 202.9 (1983). See generally Taylor, Meeting the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act's Specificity Requirement: Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems, 29
BUFFALO L. REV. 73, 81-90 (1980). Regulation B provides a creditor with the option of
formulating its own statement of reasons for adverse action on an application. Section
202.9(b)(2) of Regulation B also contains a form prepared by the Federal Reserve Board
as a sample statement of reasons for adverse action as a model for creditors to follow.
Where a credit scoring system is used, no particular method is required in selecting the
reasons provided for rejection, and no particular number of reasons must be disclosed.
The Federal Reserve Board has stated, however, that disclosure of more than four
reasons is not likely to be helpful to the applicant. 12 C.F.R. § 202.901(d) (1983).
'7 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b) (1983).
18 15 U.S.C. § 1691b (1982). The Federal Reserve Board has similar authority under
the Truth in Lending Act. Truth in Lending Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982).
19 The enforcement agencies and the creditors for which they are responsible are the
following: Comptroller of the Currency (national banks); Federal Reserve Board (state-
chartered member banks); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (non-member insured
banks); Federal Home Loan Bank Board (institutions subject to § 5(d) of the Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1982), § 407 of the National Housing
Act, 12 U.S.C. 1730 (1982), and §§ 6(i) and 17 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 1426(i), 1437 (1982)); Securities and Exchange Commission (brokers and
dealers); National Credit Union Administration (federal credit unions); Interstate Com-
merce Commission (common carriers); Civil Aeronautics Board (air carriers); Secretary
of Agriculture (activities subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-
229 (1982)); Farm Credit Administration (federal land banks, land bank associations,
federal intermediate credit banks and production credit associations); Small Business
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Critics claimed that the enforcement provisions of the 1974
Act were inadequate.20 Enforcement by the Federal Trade Com-
mission was limited to the issuance of cease and desist orders
against noncomplying creditors,21 while damage actions were
left to private litigation. Furthermore, punitive damages of up
to $10,000 in an individual action and the lesser of $100,000 or
one percent of the creditor's net worth in a class action22 were
believed to be insufficient.
In response to these criticisms, the 1976 amendments, while
retaining the dual enforcement framework, significantly
strengthened the compliance provisions of the Act. A new sec-
tion was added authorizing the United States Attorney General
to institute civil proceedings in two circumstances. First, any
of the twelve administrative agencies responsible for enforce-
ment of the Act could refer matters to the Attorney General for
litigation. Second, the Attorney General could independently
commence civil proceedings when deemed necessary to prohibit
or remedy a pattern of pervasive discrimination.2 3 Private en-
forcement was bolstered by raising the ceiling of potential re-
covery of punitive damages in class actions to the lesser of
$500,000 or one percent of the creditor's net worth.2 4 Addition-
Administration (small business investment companies); and Federal Trade Commission
(all other creditors). 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(a)(1)-(9) (1982).
20 See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments and Consumer Leasing Act:
Hearings on S. 483, S. 1927 & H.R. 6516 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
14 (1975) (statement of Rep. Sullivan (D-Mo.)). [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
21 Any violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act is subject to the same disciplinary
action as a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 45, 1691c(c)
(1982). In the case of noncompliance with an order of the Commission, violators are
subject to a civil penalty. 15 U.S.C. § 45() (1975).
22 Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 503, 88 Stat. 1524 (1974).
23 Act of March 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 6, 90 Stat. 253 (1976) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g), (h) (1982)). This provision relied on the Justice Department's
substantial civil rights legislation enforcement experience to achieve maximum compli-
ance under the Act. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 403, 415; 1975 Hearings, supra note 20, at 26.
24 Act of March 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 6, 90 Stat. 253 (1976) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1982)). This amendment caused much debate, with some
claiming that a low limit would discourage class action suits, that a high ceiling was
necessary to secure compliance, and that active private enforcement would reduce
public enforcement costs. See S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong, 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 403, 415; 1975 Hearings, supra note 20, at 210
(statement of Jeffrey M. Bucher, Gov'r, Federal Reserve Board); id. at 301 (statement
of Benny Kass, Att'y at Law, Washington, D.C.). Others (including creditors) argued
that the present ceiling was adequate, that vexatious litigation would be encouraged if
the ceiling were raised, and that a high ceiling could bankrupt small companies while
allowing excessive recoveries against large business. 1975 Hearings, supra note 20, at
303, 307, 334.
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ally, a Consumer Advisory Council was established to render
advice to the Federal Reserve Board concerning the Act and
other related matters.25
As amended, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act appeared to
be an imposing piece of antidiscrimination legislation. Commen-
tators anticipated a substantial increase in administrative activ-
ity and litigation, as toughened public and private enforcement
mechanisms combined to promote compliance with the Act.26
The intervening years, however, have produced only a few pub-
lic enforcement actions and a trickle of litigation.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE PAUCITY OF PRIVATE LITIGATION
Congress intended that private actions would provide the bul-
wark of enforcement for violations of the ECOA. 27 The ECOA
has spawned surprisingly little litigation, however, for a statute
promising to revolutionize the credit industry. Fewer than fifty
cases have been reported under the statute in the decade since
its enactment, 8 less than the number brought under the Truth
in Lending Act in an average month,29 and far less than the
number of employment cases filed in an average week under
Title VII.30 In spite of this dearth of private actions, the Federal
2 Act of March 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 3(a), 90 Stat. 253 (1976) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(b) (1982)). The Council has responsibility to render advice
on all aspects of the Consumer Credit Protection Act under the auspices of the Federal
Reserve Board. S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 403, 413.
26 See, e.g., Schiller, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: A Wellspring of Litigation?,
32 Mo. B.J. 407 (1976); 1975 Hearings, supra note 20, at 575-76 (letter from Dawson,
Riddell, Taylor, Davis & Holroyd submitted on behalf of Beneficial Corporation).
27 S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEwS 403, 415.
18 A LEXIS search for ECOA cases (GEN FED and STATES libraries) identified 77
decisions citing the ECOA. Of these, only 48 involve actual cases based in whole or
part on the Act. See also 1981 ATT'Y GEN. REP. TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE
EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976, at 4 ("Although the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act [Amendments] ha[ve] now been in effect for more than five
years, we know of only 29 private cases being brought under it."); M. GREENFIELD,
CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 214 (1983) ("From 1975 through 1980 consumers filed fewer
than thirty cases to enforce their rights under the ECOA.").
29 Cf. F. MILLER & B. CLARK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION
199 (1980) ("There have been to date some 14,000 lawsuits" under TILA, enacted in
1968).
30 Over 8,000 discrimination suits were filed in federal courts in 1983, a weekly average
of over 150. 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 116 (1984) Over 47,000 charges were filed with
the EEOC in 1973, and the Commission in 1972 took informal action in 2,800 cases and
closed 970 cases after a formal decision. MARSHALL, KNAPP, LEGGETT & GLOVER,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REM-
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Reserve Board discovered over 17,000 violations of the Act
during routine bank examinations over one eighteen-month
period.31
The paucity of private litigation under the ECOA may dis-
courage potential plaintiffs from bringing credit discrimination
suits because they believe they only have a slim chance of
prevailing. Furthermore, the small number of cases brought may
cause legislators or administrators to overestimate the statute's
effectiveness as a regulatory device. Although startling, the lack
of litigation under the Act is readily explainable as a result of
certain provisions of the Act and Regulation B, combined with
the nature of the credit market.
A. The Strictures of the Statute and Regulation B
It is easy to see why the Act and its implementing regulations
have chilled private enforcement. First, there is no minimum
statutory recovery under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.32
Existence of a statutory minimum is especially important in
discrimination cases, because actual damages are often specu-
lative. 33 Congress recognized this in the Truth in Lending Act,
under which a creditor is liable for a minimum of $100 in addition
to court costs, legal fees and actual damages. 34
Second, the Act's provisions regarding notice of adverse
action 35 do little to encourage private enforcement. In amending
the Act, Congress had to decide whether written notification of
EDIES 3-4 (1978). By 1983, the number of job bias charges filed with the EEOC had
increased to 112,000 annually. 115 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 115 (1984). In 1977 the EEOC
initiated 181 lawsuits, but in 1982 it filed only 82 suits. 114 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 185
(1983).
31 Statements to Congress, 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 742-743 (1978) (statement of Philip C.
Jackson, Gov'r, Federal Reserve Board, before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Con-
sumer, and Monetary Affairs of the Comm. on Government Operations, U.S. House of
Representatives, September 15, 1978).
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 1691c (1982).
33 Several courts have held that mental distress, humiliation, and embarrassment are
cognizable "actual damages" under the Act even though no out-of-pocket loss resulted.
See Anderson v. United Finance Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982); Sayers v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 522 F.Supp. 835, 841 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Owens v.
Magee Finance Service, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 758, 770 (E.D. La. 1979); Shuman v. Standard
Oil Co. of California, 453 F.Supp. 1150, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1978). An award of punitive
damages under the Act, while not dependent on a showing of actual injury, has been
construed as requiring a minimum finding of reckless disregard of the requirements of
the law. See Anderson v. United Finance Co., 666 F.2d at 1278 and cases cited therein.
11 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1982). This statutory penalty is imposed with respect to violation
of a number of specific TILA requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1982).
35 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2) (1982).
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the reasons for adverse action should be automatically furnished
to an applicant, furnished only upon an applicant's request, or
not furnished at all.36 The original Senate Bill embodying the
1976 amendments required automatic notification.3 7 While some
argued that this requirement would discourage credit discrimi-
nation, educate consumers, and assist administrative enforce-
ment,38 creditors complained of its expense and burden. 39 In the
end, Congress compromised and required creditors to furnish a
written explanation of reasons for adverse action only upon the
applicant's request.40 The amendments also provided, however,
that creditors must notify applicants of their right to request
disclosure of these reasons. Theoretically, the difficulty of bring-
ing credit discrimination suits without knowing the reasons for
denial has been eliminated, 41 but as a practical matter few con-
sumers take the time to request a written explanation of the
creditor's denial. 42
Additionally, the promulgation of Regulation B itself may
have deterred private actions. At hearings on the initial adoption
of the ECOA in 1974, the Federal Reserve Board argued that
the Act would be better enforced without specific rules, 43 allow-
ing the courts to mold the Act's broad proscription against dis-
crimination in light of individual cases. Nonetheless, Congress
36 The original Act did not require any form of notice to applicants. The Federal
Reserve Board, despite lack of explicit authorization, promulgated regulations requiring
notice. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(m)(l)-(2) (1976).
37 S. 1927, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701(d), reprinted in 1975 Hearings, supra note 20,
at 148-149.
38 S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 7-8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 403, 406, 409-410; see generally Thain, Credit Advertising and the Law:
Truth in Lending and Related Matters, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 257, 258.
39 See, e.g., 1975 Hearings, supra note 20, at 264-65 (testimony of Forrest D. Jones
on behalf of the American Bankers Association). See also id. at 285 (response to
questions directed to Forrest D. Jones). Sears, Roebuck & Co. prepared data indicating
that each letter of rejection could cost over five dollars to prepare, and that the cost of
sending such letters to rejected applicants in 1974 would be over $8 million. Id. at 402.
4 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2)(B) (1982). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(5) (1982), providing
an exemption for small businesses.
41 See 1975 Hearings, supra note 20, at 219 (statement of Sheldon Feldman, Ass't
Dir. for Special Statutes, Federal Trade Comm'n); S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CONG. CODE & AD. NEws 403, 410.
42 See 1975 Hearings, supra note 20, at 375-82 (statement of John A. Dillon on behalf
of Natonal Bankamericard, Inc.). The content of the letter stating the reasons for the
adverse action is a complex matter in itself, particularly when statistical methods of
credit determination are employed. See generally, Taylor, Meeting the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act's Specificity Requirement: Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems,
29 BUFFALO L. REV. 73 (1980).
43 Credit Discrimination: Hearings on H.R. 14856 and H.R. 14908 Before the Sub-
comm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 231 (1974) (statement of Jeffrey M. Bucher, Gov'r, Federal Reserve Board).
1984]
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ordered the Board to promulgate regulations to enforce the
Act. 4 In response, the Board spelled out in great detail the
kinds of information that could, and could not, be asked of
applicants or used to evaluate applicants, 45 and also published
model application forms.46
Contrary to expectations, 47 the complexity of Regulation B,
combined with creditors' generally greater familiarity with the
Act's requirements, actually may have discouraged successful
private litigation. A creditor's good faith reliance on or conform-
ity with promulgated rules and forms immunizes it from liability;
therefore ambiguities in the Act or Regulation B are effectively
resolved against an applicant. 48 Furthermore, an applicant must
prove actual damages for any violations of the Act that are not
so protected. 49
The realities of the credit market enhance the problems posed
by the Act and Regulation B for private enforcement. Individ-
uals who are denied credit by large creditors may not assert
their rights because of institutional formidability and obvious
bargaining inequalities. Conversely, unsuccessful applicants for
credit from small, local credit-granting businesses may not as-
sert their rights because they fear reprisal or do not wish to
alienate the creditor. Additionally, the availability of credit al-
ternatives further discourages prosecution of possible ECOA
violations. Most credit applicants realize that alternative sources
of credit exist.50 Except for the most uncreditworthy, effort is
"Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 503, 88 Stat. 1522 (1974) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a) (1982)).
45 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.5-202.6 (1983).
4112 C.F.R. Part 202, App. B (1983).
41 See, e.g., 1975 Hearings, supra note 20, at 575-76 (letter From Dawson, Riddell,
Taylor, Davis & Holyroyd submitted on behalf of Beneficial Corporation). See generally
Comment, An Empirical Analysis of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 13 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 102, 112-17 (1979).
48 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(e) (1982). This same immunity results from official staff inter-
pretations. Id. See also 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (1983).
49 See supra note 33. See also Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Service Co., 605 F.2d
566, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (no interim attorneys' fee award).
10 See, e.g., Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 708 F.2d 143, 145 (5th Cir.
1983); McKenzie v. United States Home Corp., 704 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1983). A com-
petitive model of the credit market would conclude that discrimination by one creditor
unrelated to creditworthiness would allow its competitors to underprice it and thereby
force it out of business. Certainly some portions of the credit market face these pres-
sures. See, e.g., Marshall, Discrimination in Consumer Credit, in REGULATION OF
CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES, 240, 244 (A. Heggestad ed. 1981). On the other hand,
transaction costs of acquiring information may allow leeway for discrimination by firms.
See Furubatyn & Petrovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent
Literature, 10 J. OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 1137-83 (1972).
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usually better spent seeking credit alternatives than challenging
a questionable credit denial.
Moreover, much discrimination occurs not when credit is
completely denied, but when credit is granted on different terms
from those sought by the applicant. For example, a person
seeking an unsecured loan may be required to provide collateral,
or a loan application for ninety-five percent financing might be
countered by an offer to finance only eighty percent. Neither of
these situations necessarily involves ECOA-prohibited discrim-
ination, but they both raise the question whether they are suf-
ficient "adverse action" to require notification to the consumer
of her ECOA rights and a statement of reasons for the denial of
credit on the requested terms. In order to be effective, the notice
of adverse action should be required within the broadest sphere
of situations which may constitute credit discrimination.
The Act defines adverse action as "a denial or revocation of
credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement,
or a refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on
substantially the terms requested," 51 a definition which is broad
enough to include all significant discrimination in credit terms.
In Regulation B, however, the Federal Reserve Board limited
the Act's definition of adverse action so that no notice of adverse
action is required when a counteroffer is accepted by the con-
sumer, even when the terms of the credit are substantially dif-
ferent from those sought by the consumer.5 2 Given the fact that
the consumer's primary goal is simply to obtain credit on some
terms, 53 the Board's definition provides a large loophole for
creditors who are able to adjust their terms (often institutions
making installment or home mortgage loans).5 4 A consumer who
accepts credit on terms different from those requested has no
right to receive notice of adverse action.55 Because the notice
is designed to increase consumer awareness of possible discrim-
51 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6) (1982).
52 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c)(1) (1983). In contrast, the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires
that an adverse action notice be given whenever credit "is denied or the charge for such
credit or insurance is increased ...." 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1982).
13 See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 11 (1972) ("[c]onsumers seldom shop for credit outside their own city.")
- Variation in charges on a case-by-case basis is much less likely with respect to
credit or charge cards, and in those situations consumer shopping can easily occur
between companies competing for card business.
-5 See Dorsey v. Citizens & Southern Financial Corp., 678 F.2d 137, 139 (1lth Cir.
1982).
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ination,56 dispensing with the notice in these circumstances de-
creases the likelihood that a discrimination claim will be
brought.
B. Proof Problems in Private ECOA Suits
1. Approaches to Proving Discrimination. Congress clearly
envisioned that large-scale private litigation alleging substantive
discrimination would be brought under the Act. The statute
provides for generous class action recoveries and attorneys' fee
awards.5 7 A class action can result in substantial financial sanc-
tions that would deter a creditor from repeatedly violating the
law.58
Despite these expectations, most suits have been based on
purely technical violations of the Act's information bars or no-
tification provisions. A handful of substantive discrimination
claims have been prosecuted, all based on isolated instances of
discrimination. 59 No class actions have been successfully
prosecuted. 60
To understand this lack of far-reaching substantive litigation
under the Act, it is important to focus on the methods of proof
of substantive discrimination that were initially developed in
employment discrimination cases. Absent clear proof of discrim-
56 See S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 403, 410; Equal Credit Opportunity, 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 101, 102 (1977).
See generally Note, The Not-So-Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 5 ORANGE COUNTY B.J.
363, 366 (1978).
37 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1982).
51 Discussion of the class action as a consumer enforcement mechanism is found in
Fetterly, The Application of the Class Action to Consumer Litigation, 24 FED'N INS.
COUNSEL Q. 4 (1973); Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer
Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842 (1974).
31 See, e.g., Brothers v. First Leasing, 724 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1984) (ECOA prohibitions
against discrimination on the basis of sex and marital status apply to consumer leases);
Miller v. American Express Co., 688 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1982) (cancellation of wife's
supplementary account upon spouse's death); Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Service
Co., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (refusal of lender to aggregate incomes of unmarried
couple applying for mortgage loan). See also United States v. American Future Systems,
Inc., 571 F.Supp. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (special purpose credit program which discrimi-
nated in favor of white, single women).
6 A denial of class certification was affirmed in Denard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 636
F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1980). Dismissal of the named plaintiff's claim meant the death of
the class in Nguyen v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 513 F.Supp. 1039 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
See also Humphrey v. J.B. Land Co., 478 F. Supp. 770 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Gary v.
Spires, 473 F.Supp. 878 (D. S.C. 1980).
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inatory intent,61 a consumer has two ways to prove discrimina-
tion: disparate treatment or disparate impact. 62
Disparate treatment occurs when some people are treated less
favorably than others because of an identifiable characteristic
such as race, sex or national origin. Discriminatory intent is
proved by evidence that the creditor's stated reason for refusing
credit to the plaintiff was not applied by the creditor to others
situated similarly to the plaintiff.63 In essence, proof of disparate
treatment is an attempt to show discriminatory intent by means
of circumstantial evidence.
Beginning with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,64 Title
VII employment discrimination cases have set forth the process
of proving disparate treatment by allocating the burden of pro-
duction between the plaintiff employee and the defendant em-
ployer. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation in an employment discrimination suit by showing that
she: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) applied and was
qualified for the job for which applicants were sought; (3) was
rejected despite her qualifications; and (4) after her rejection the
position remained open and persons of her qualifications contin-
ued to be sought. 65 Similarly, in an ECOA suit, a rejected credit
applicant might prove disparate treatment by showing that:
(1) she belonged to a protected class; (2) she applied for credit
and was financially able and willing to repay; (3) she was never-
theless refused credit; and (4) the creditor continues to seek to
extend credit to other applicants with similar willingness and
ability to repay.66
61 Such evidence is understandably rare. One of the closest approximations of an
intentionally discriminatory statement appears in Morgan v. First National Bank of
Springdale, Civ. No. 77-5055 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 16, 1979). In Morgan, a black applicant
was told that the "bank had lent out all its available money" and was asked whether he
was a customer of the bank but he was not told that the bank's policy was to lend only
to customers.
62 The disparate treatment/disparate impact dichotomy is deceptive for two reasons.
First there may be no clear line between the two types of claims in any given case.
Second, this two-category grouping hides a greater variety of distinctions among types
of discrimination. See generally Miller v. American Express Co., 688 F.2d 1235 (9th
Cir. 1982); Lamber, Reskin & Dworkin, The Relevance of Statistics to Prove Discrim-
ination: A Typology, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 553 (1983).
6 See Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 522 F. Supp. 835 (W.D. Mo.
1981); Cragin v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 379 (D. Nev. 1980).
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
6 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
6 See generally Sayers v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 522 F.Supp. 835 (W.D.
Mo. 1981); Cragin v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 379 (D. Nev.
1980). See also Crawford v. Northeastern Oklahoma State Univ., 713 F.2d 586 (10th
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Once the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation, the creditor must "articulate some legitimate non-dis-
criminatory reason" 67 for the applicant's rejection. As the Court
explained the shifting burden of proof in Furnco Construction
Co. v. Waters,68 a "prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas
raises an inference of discrimination only because [the court]
presume[s] these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely
than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." 69
The creditor's burden to rebut this inference can be met by
articulation of a reason for the action that is not based on a
prohibited classification. The burden of production then shifts
back to the plaintiff to prove that the creditor's stated reason is
merely a pretext for discrimination.7"
Alternatively, a plaintiff may show that the apparently neutral
application of the defendant's credit criteria results in a system-
atic exclusion of one of the classes protected by the Act, re-
sulting in a disparate impact on that group. Disparate impact
differs from disparate treatment in that in the former case the
plaintiff need not prove that the creditor intentionally discrimi-
nated against the applicant. 71
Cir. 1983) (in discriminatory discharge employment discrimination suit, plaintiff need
not show qualifications of person hired in place of plaintiff, but merely that another was
employed in plaintiff's stead).
67 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
6"438 U.S. 567 (1978).
69 Id. at 577.
70 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973). In practical terms,
the burden on the plaintiff is weighty compared with that of the defendant. Proof of
pretext, in addition to developing a prima facie case, often involves complex use of
statistics which are neither easy to interpret nor readily available to the plaintiff. In
addition, a recent Supreme Court decision, Texas Dept. of Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981), has interpreted the employer/creditor's burden to be "only the burden of
explaining clearly the non-discriminatory reasons for its actions," not the burden of
actually proving the legitimacy of that reason. After Burdine, it appears that in the
employment context, and probably in the credit area as well, the burden of production
in proving discriminatory intent has been shifted more heavily onto the shoulders of the
party charging discrimination.
71 As stated by the Supreme Court in the seminal employment discrimination case of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971):
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business ne-
cessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
We do not suggest that either the District Court or the Court of Appeals
erred in examining the employer's intent; but good intent or absence of dis-
criminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mech-
anisms that operate as "built-in headwinds" for minority groups and are un-
related to measuring job capability.
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A three-step disparate impact test, also known as the "effects
test, 72 was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in two em-
ployment discrimination cases, Griggs v. Duke Power
Company73 and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 74 This test op-
erates as a disparate treatment test in shifting the burden of
proof between the parties. In essence, a disparate impact test
requires a plaintiff to show that the creditor's facially neutral
standard in fact selects applicants in a significantly discrimina-
tory pattern. If the creditor's practices are shown to have a
disparate impact on a certain group, the creditor must show that
the challenged policy is predictive of performance or that busi-
ness necessity mandates the use of the allegedly discriminatory
practice. Under Title VII, the practice must be job-related;
under the ECOA the practice must relate to creditworthiness.
In order to prevail, the plaintiff must present a less discrimina-
tory alternative that equally serves the legitimate business pur-
poses of the creditor.75
2. Credit Discrimination Proof Problems. As a practical mat-
ter, an unsuccessful credit applicant faces difficult obstacles in
proving allegations of discrimination. In order to prove either
disparate treatment or disparate impact, the applicant must de-
velop data on other applicants.76 To prove disparate treatment,
the applicant must show that the only difference between herself
and others granted credit was her sex, race or other protected
classification. The need for statistical data is even greater to
prove disparate impact. The applicant must show that the cred-
itor rejected statistically significant disproportionate numbers of
persons in protected classes. This assumes that applicants can
be separated by statutory classification.
Under the ECOA and Regulation B, the development of such
applicant pool data is virtually impossible. The Act does not
prohibit a creditor from requesting information regarding pro-
tected characteristics, but merely prohibits discrimination based
7 See S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 403, 406; 12 C.F.R. § 202.6, n.7 (1983) (explictly approving use of effects
test in ECOA cases).
7 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
- 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
75 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,329 (1979); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
76 Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980). For a discussion of
the possible use of population statistics in lieu of applicant pool data, see infra note 91.
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on those characteristics.77 Regulation B goes beyond the statute,
however, by absolutely prohibiting creditors from requesting
information relating to certain protected characteristics."'
The prohibition in Regulation B on information requests re-
lating to certain characteristics may have been based on the
theory that prevention of the recording of information would
prevent discrimination. For the great bulk of credit requests,
however, these information bars only impede effective private
enforcement. If creditors cannot collect the data, applicants
cannot learn it from creditors through discovery, and cannot
prove that other unsuccessful applicants share the protected
characteristic. An applicant therefore cannot establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. 79
The effect of this information void is magnified because dis-
crimination is inherent in the credit-granting process among
applicants deemed good business risks, or "creditworthy," and
those deemed to present unacceptably high risks. Creditors use
two general types of application evaluation systems: judgmental
and statistical. Traditionally, creditors have judged creditwor-
thiness subjectively. A credit officer examines an applicant's
personal characteristics and other related information (such as
home ownership, income, length of employment and credit ref-
erences) in evaluating an applicant's ability and willingness to
pay.80 The credit officer bases her decision on both her prior
7 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1982). Some negative inference might be drawn from other
sections of the Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b)(1), (2), and (4) (1982). The legislative
history of the Act, however, seems to dispel that inference. See H.R. REP. No. 210,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975). See generally Maltz & Miller, The Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act and Regulation B, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 20 (1978).
73 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d) (1983). One exception to this prohibition relates to the purchase
of residential property, where creditors are specifically required to record information
on protected classifications. 12 C.F.R. § 202.13(a) (1983). Other sporadic exceptions
exist with respect to specific characteristics and requests. See supra notes 15-16 and
accompanying text. See generally Maltz & Miller, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
and Regulation B, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 20-25 (1978).
79 See, e.g., Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F.Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Cf. Con-
sumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Truth
in Lending Act documents not obtainable under FOIA).
80 Information generally falls into one of three categories: capacity, character, and
collateral. "Capacity" refers to an applicant's ability to repay the loan. "Character"
concerns whether she will repay, and "collateral" concerns whether the creditor will be
protected if she does not repay. The primary purpose of the ECOA is to assure that
every stage of the credit decisionmaking process is fair and does not rely upon factors
unrelated to any applicant's ability or desire to be a safe credit risk. See Churchill,
Nevin & Watson, The Role of Credit Scoring in the Loan Decision, THE CREDIT WORLD,
March 1977, at 6.
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experience as a credit risk evaluator and institutional
guidelines.81
The other method of evaluating creditworthiness, statistical
analysis or "credit scoring," uses a numerical formula to predict
creditworthiness. The Federal Reserve Board sanctions the use
of a credit scoring system if it is "empirically derived" and
"demonstrably and statistically sound. '82 Each factor in the ap-
plicant's credit profile is given a numerical score based on a pre-
set schedule, and the applicant's total score is determined by
adding the individual attribute scores. The creditor's action is
objectively determined by the score's position on an established
scale. Credit is granted, denied, or the application is held pend-
ing acquisition of further information, such as a credit report.
No subjective factors need enter into the credit decision. 83
The information bars of Regulation B do not prevent illegal
discrimination by most judgmental creditors. Many judgmental
creditors, such as banks and other financial institutions, employ
loan officers who meet with prospective loan customers face to
face. The applicant's race, sex, and age are clearly visible to
the person making the initial credit decision. The very fact that
the system is judgmental and allows the credit officer wide
discretion means that factors such as an applicant's race, sex,
marital status and age may receive consideration in the deter-
mination of whether to grant credit. Under these circumstances,
the Regulation's prohibitions merely eliminate the possibility of
81 The judgmental system of credit analysis suffers from several flaws. First, the
system is based on the imperfect recollection of the credit officer, that is both limited
and distorted by prior experiences. Second, either because of the strength of the credit
officer's recollection or because of informal institutional guidelines, the judgmental
system reacts slowly to changes in creditworthiness of the applicant pool. For example,
reliance on the maxim of the three "P's" (never lend to preachers, plumbers or prosti-
tutes) or the three "B's" (never lend to beauticians, bartenders or barbers) may have
some intuitive appeal but little or no empirical verification. See Main, A New Way to
Score with Lenders, MONEY, Feb. 1977, at 73.
82 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p)(2) (1983). A scoring system is considered to be empirically
derived if it evaluates creditworthiness primarily by allocating points to key attributes,
with the points derived from empirical comparison of the creditor's past creditworthy
and noncreditworthy applicants. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (p)(1) (1983). A scoring system is
demonstratively and statistically sound if it is "developed for the purpose of predicting
the creditworthiness of applicants with respect to legitimate business interests of the
creditor utilizing the system, including, but not limited to, minimizing bad debt losses
and operating expenses in accordance with the creditor's business judgment." 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.2(p)(2)(ii) (1983).
83 Some creditors do combine credit scoring with a judgmental element for a class of
applicants neither clearly creditworthy nor uncreditworthy. See Hsia, Credit Scoring
and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 371, 395-96 (1978).
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demonstrating the factors in the credit decision for purposes of
proving disparate treatment. 84
The converse situation applies to creditors using credit scor-
ing systems, such as large department store chains (e.g., Sears
or Penneys), credit card companies (e.g., Visa and Mastercard),
and very large finance companies.15 Barring questions relating
to protected characteristics certainly prevents their considera-
tion in a scoring system, but if no bar existed, creditor reliance
on such characteristics in a purely mechanical scoring system
would be relatively easy to detect. 86
A more subtle problem is also presented by the information
bars in the credit scoring context. Although discrimination can-
not take place by direct consideration of protected-class char-
acteristics, a creditor may substitute significantly correlated
proxies for those prohibited pieces of information. For example,
zip codes might be substituted for race,87 or home ownership
might be used in place of race or sex.88 Use of these proxies
could be challenged on grounds of disparate impact as having
the effect of rejecting members of a protected class in dispro-
portionate numbers. 89
14 As part of the hearings on the 1976 amendments to the ECOA, a regulatory pro-
vision was suggested which would have limited the recording of protected-class char-
acteristics to those visible to the creditor. See HEARINGS ON THE 1976 AMENDMENTS
TO THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT BEFORE THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD,
16-17 (August 12, 1976) (on file at the Federal Reserve Board) (statement of J. Stanley
Pottenger, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Division, Dept. of Justice); Fed. Res. Bd.
Press Release (July 15, 1976) at 38-40.
81 See Shay, Brandt & Sexton, Public Regulation of Financial Services: The Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, in REGULATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES, 208 (A.
Heggestad ed. 1981).
If applications are computer scored, the computer program would show that suspect
class factors were considered as part of the program's total score determination. If
applications are scored by humans, the "program" is the scale presented to the person
figuring the score. Any phantom points given for prohibited characteristics would be
detected because the given total score would be greater than the predicted score based
on the scale's points for consideration of proper factors.
17 This was the basis of the claim in Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F.Supp. 1026
(N.D. Ga. 1980). The substitution of zip codes for race is so widely accepted that at
least one full-scale attempt was made to prohibit place-of-residence discrimination. See
Credit Card Redlining: Hearings on S. 15 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs
of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings].
m See, e.g., Nevin and Churchill, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: An Evaluation,
43 J. MARKETING, Spring 1979, at 95, 100-02. The question is not whether the infor-
mation has no relation to risk, for nearly any factor a creditor could choose may have
some correlation to wealth and therefore to traditional standards of creditworthiness.
Rather the question is one of sufficient relation to risk. The regulations purport to act
as a mechanical check on the types of information acquired. By prohibiting the acqui-
sition of information that is highly prejudicial or of little predictive value, it is assumed
the misuse of that information can also be controlled.
19 See, e.g. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII employment
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To prove an effects test case, an applicant must be able to
statistically compare the proportion of members of the relevant
protected class who are within the applicant pool with the pro-
portion in the group granted credit. The cost of collecting and
presenting this information when statistical data is available is
extremely high,90 but if the creditor is barred from collecting
information altogether on protected characteristics, comparative
proportions cannot even be determined. 9' Thus, the Regulation
B information bars originally designed to protect disadvantaged
consumers prevent those same consumers from proving sys-
temic discrimination under the effects test.92
Even assuming that a consumer could clear the initial data
discrimination case); Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F.Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(ECOA). In the employment area, it is often relatively easy to identify a discriminatory
employer practice and its effect on employees singly or in a group. In contrast, a
creditor's use of complex statistical systems may consider numerous factors, some of
which may relate to creditworthiness only in conjunction with other factors. The plaintiff
may choose either to attack the system as a whole or to attempt to isolate elements
which appear to adversely affect a protected class. The use and interpretation of
statistics itself requires an expertise which may be outside the experience of most
plaintiffs and counsel. There is always the danger that the plaintiff may through inex-
perience with the use of statistics produce exhaustive quantitative data that ends up
proving the wrong point. Finally, as a matter of cold reality, few rejected credit appli-
cants are likely to have the financial resources to finance both the discovery and use of
experts necessary to build a strong statistical case.
90 See generally Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 371, 421-422 (1978); 1979 Hearings, supra note 87, at 63 (statement of
Robert L. Schwind).
91 Whether the disproportionate impact may be shown by use of population statistics,
or whether resort to actual applicant data will be required, depends to some extent on
whether the selective criterion is related to biology or performance. See Lamber, Raskin
& Dworkin, The Relevance of Statistics to Prove Discrimination: A Typology, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 553, 585-88 (1983). This dichotomy, however, seems to beg the question.
In any event, courts applying ECOA have not been receptive to use of population
statistics. See Morgan v. First Nat'l Bank of Springdale, Civ. No. 77-5055 (W.D. Ark.
Jan 16, 1979). The plaintiff in Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F.Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga.
1980), attempted to devise substitute statistics that the court found wanting. For a
description of the methods used see 1979 Hearings, supra note 87, at 20-63. See
generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971); Personnel Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1979).
92 Much has been written about the application of the effects test to ECOA cases on
the mistaken presumption that it would be a significant part of private ECOA enforce-
ment. See, e.g., Baer, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the "Effects Test", 95
BANKING L.J. 241 (1978); Note, Credit Scoring and the ECOA: Applying the Effects
Test, 88 YALE L.J. 1450 (1979). Regulation B itself negates some of the potential impact
of the effects test in one other way. The regulations allow a creditor to use factors such
as minimum income and past credit history to evaluate creditworthiness. Use of any
factor that correlates with wealth or past economic advantage, however, will inevitably
disproportionately disfavor minorities and women. One possible way for consumers to
use the disparate impact test to their advantage would be to attack the creditor's scoring
system as a whole, claiming that it rejects protected class members in a disproportionate
manner, and shifting to the creditor the burden of showing that such disproportionate
impact is justified. See Miller v. American Express Co., 688 F.2d 1235, 1242 n. 3 (9th
Cir. 1982) (Poole, J., dissenting).
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availability and cost hurdles a credit scoring system poses to
establishing a prima facie case, an applicant pursuing a disparate
impact claim faces other obstacles. Under the three-part dis-
parate impact test, the creditor would then have to prove that
the criterion attacked has a manifest relationship to creditwor-
thiness. 93 The Federal Reserve Board has lifted this burden from
creditors' shoulders by proclaiming that, in an "empirically de-
rived" and "statistically sound" credit scoring system, all factors
employed by the creditor inherently have a manifest relationship
to creditworthiness. 94 The consumer must then show that the
legitimate needs of the creditor can be as readily served by
substitution of some other factor.95 By hypothesis, however, the
scoring system uses the most predictive pieces of information
available. 96 It just may be that the category used is as discrim-
inatory as it is predictive. 97
It appears that the only situation where the information bars
might help an applicant is in a judgmental system where the
person evaluating the loan application does not ever see the
applicant. Such systems are used by some large financial insti-
tutions in major metropolitan areas. There ground level person-
nel take credit applications, but credit decisions are made up-
stairs. 98 Usually in such larger institutions loans are made and
applications are assessed according to a written policy. In this
situation the regulation's information bars would prevent the
creditor from taking into account protected characeristics in
assessing creditworthiness. As in the credit-scoring situation,
however, factors which the institution's formal credit policy
identifies as significant may in effect be proxies for protected
categories. 99 Once again, however, proof of the disproportionate
impact of these proxies is all but impossible because Regulation
91 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 432 (1971) (factor used by employer in Title VII case must have "manifest rela-
tionship to employment in question").
"I Equal Credit Opportunity, 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 101, 107 (1977). See also Nevin and
Churchill, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: An Evaluation, 43 J. MARKETING, Spring,
1979, at 95, 100-02.
9-1 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
96 See Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
371,417-30 (1978).
97 Nevin & Churchill, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: An Evaluation, 43 J.
MARKETING, Spring, 1979, at 95, 100-02.
"This appears to be the system of credit decisionmaking that provided the basis for
the regulations. For an example of this system in operation, see Fischl v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 708 F.2d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1983).
99 See Statements to Congress, 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 475, 476 (1979); see also supra
notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
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B prohibits the creditor from requesting the information neces-
sary to identify members of the protected class.
IV. ANEMIC PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
Although public enforcement of the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act is divided among several government agencies, three are of
primary importance.10° The Federal Reserve Board's authority
to prescribe and amend Regulation B, together with its authority
to enforce compliance by state-chartered member banks, makes
it the primary proponent of public enforcement. The Federal
Trade Commission is responsible for credit card issuers and all
creditors not specifically responsible to other agencies. Finally,
the ability of the Attorney General to bring civil proceedings for
ECOA violations, added as part of the 1976 amendments, cre-
ates a significant opportunity for effective and visible public
enforcement.
A. Federal Reserve Board
The task of the Federal Reserve Board (Board) in securing
compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act has not been
easy. The Board's difficulties in promulgating regulations to
carry out the Act'0 1 derive from the inherently discriminatory
nature of the credit-granting process.'0 2 A creditor must fully
consider an applicant's characteristics in order to make a ra-
tional and profitable judgment as to creditworthiness. Congress,
however, has condemned the denial of credit to certain individ-
uals or groups on the basis of certain characteristics that it
considers unrelated to creditworthiness.1 0 3 If Congress could not
adequately resolve these competing tensions in enacting the
statute, it may be unrealistic to believe that the Board would
fare better.'04
100 See supra notes 18-19, 23 and accompanying text.
101 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1691b(a) (1982).
102 See generally Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 371 (1978).
103 S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 403, 405; H.R. REP. No. 210, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. 3 (1976).
104 See generally Hume, A Suggested Analysis for Regulation of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 52 WASH. L. REV. 335, 342 (1977). For a sampling of the views of
commentators on the efficacy of the Board's regulations, compare Comment, Equal
Credit: Promise as Reality, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 186, 214 (1976) with Note,
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Most of the commentary on the Act criticizes the lines drawn
by the Board in promulgating Regulation B. 105 The Board per-
forms a dual administrative role, overseeing the regulation of
ECOA (and a dozen other consumer credit protection laws for
which Congress has assigned the Board special responsibil-
ity),106 while also supervising and regulating commercial
banks. 0 7 Early on, the Board candidly recognized the conflict
inherent in its dual role: "There is always the risk that Federal
regulations might-without intending to do so, and without even
accomplishing positive benefits-so hobble the credit-granting
process as to significantly increase credit losses."'0 8 These con-
cerns underlay the Board's initial views that no regulations
should be adopted'0 9 and that the 1976 amendments broadening
the Act were premature."10
The Board has followed its Congressional mandate in adopting
regulations and has taken substantial steps to enforce compli-
ance with the Act. The Board has attempted to educate consum-
ers and creditors regarding the requirements of the Act and
Regulation B."' The Board receives, reviews and investigates
or refers to other agencies approximately 700 consumer equal
credit opportunity complaints each year." 2 In 1981 the Board
adopted an Interagency Policy Statement defining the parame-
ters of regulatory enforcement strategy in an effort to coordinate
the ECOA enforcement policies of the Federal Deposit Insur-
The Not-So-Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 5 ORANGE COUNTY B.J. 363, 364 (1978) and
Comment, Equal Credit for All--An Analysis of the 1976 Amendments to the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 326, 345 (1978).
I01 See, e.g., Blakely, Credit Opportunity for Women: The ECOA and Its Effects,
1981 Wis. L. REV. 655; Maltz & Miller, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regu-
lation B, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1978); Reizenstein, A Fresh Look at the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 14 AKRON L. REV. 215 (1980); Taylor, Meeting the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act's Specificity Requirement: Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems,
29 BUFFALO L. REV. 73 (1980); Comment, The 1976 Amendments to the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 633 (1976); Comment, Equal Credit for all--An
Analysis of the 1976 Amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 22 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 326 (1978).
106 1980 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 167.
107 1981 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 180-93; Complying with Consumer Credit Regu-
lations: A Challenge, 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 769, 770 (1977).
101 Statements to Congress, 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 280 (1975).
109 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
110 Statements to Congress, 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 474-76, 479-80. For a less generous
view of the Board's purposes in taking these and other positions, see Comment, Equal
Credit: Promise or Reality, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 186 (1976).
11 1980 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 178; see, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity, 63 Fed.
Res. Bull. 101-07 (1977).
M12 1981 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 157; 1980 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 185.
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ance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
and the National Credit Union Administration.11 3
Since the enactment of the ECOA, the Board has adopted an
affirmative program of special compliance examinations of state
member banks.1 14 These examinations show a steady improve-
ment in bank compliance.11 5 The Board also has undertaken
studies of the cost of compliance by creditors and the use by
consumers of the protective provisions of the Act and
regulations. 116
The Board has focused its enforcement programs on compli-
ance with the procedural requirements of the Act and Regulation
B, such as application forms, notifications of reasons for credit
denials, data notation requirements, and record keeping." 7 This
has been instrumental in eliminating technical violations of the
ECOA and Regulation B, educating creditors about the Act's
requirements, and providing consumers with the knowledge and
data needed to understand the Act and enforce their rights.
Despite this active program, however, there appears to be a
lack of broad scale attacks by the Board on possible deep-seated
discrimination problems.118 The Board has chosen to approach
enforcement in a low-key manner, opting for the present not to
"publicly name institutions that repeatedly fail to correct dis-
criminatory practices."11 9 The Board has released strong policy
statements on such basic substantive matters as discouraging
applicants on a prohibited basis and using credit criteria in a
discriminatory manner in evaluating applications.1 20 The ques-
"1 46 Fed. Reg. 56,500 (1981).
114 Complying with Consumer Credit Regulations: A Challenge, 63 Fed. Res. Bull.
769-73 (1977); Statements to Congress, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 20-23 (1980).
". In 1982 the Board found that more than two-thirds of the examined banks were in
full compliance with Regulation B, up from 51 percent in 1981, 40 percent in 1980 and
23 percent in 1979. Only 20 percent of the noncomplying institutions in 1981 had violated
five or more of Regulation B's more than 170 provisions. Other agencies have reported
a similar improvement in compliance. 1982 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 155, 1981 FED.
RES. BD. ANN. REP. 154-55; 1980 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 177-78.
116 See Exercise of Consumer Rights Under the Equal Credit Opportunity and Fair
Credit Billing Acts, 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 363 (1978); Announcements, 67 Fed. Res. Bull.
625 (1981). See generally Nevin & Churchill, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act: An
Evaluation, 43 J. MARKETING, Spring, 1979, at 95; Murphy, Economies of Scale in tile
Cost of Compliance With Consumer Credit Protection Laws: The Case of Implemen-
tation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, 10 J. BANK RESEARCH 248 (1980).
117 1982 FED. RES. BD. ANN REP. 155-56; Statements to Congress, 64 Fed. Res. Bull.
742, 743 (1978).
Il The Board in the past three years has taken formal action against only a handful
of institutions. 1982 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 156; 1981 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP.
154; 1980 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 177.
119 Statements to Congress, 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 742, 743 (1978).
12o See Announcements, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 855-56 (1981). Interagency Policy State-
Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 21:371
tion is whether the Board can and will effectively enforce its
asserted policies.
To some extent the Board (like other public enforcement
agencies) faces the same problems of proof which beset private
litigants. Proof of widespread illegal discrimination requires ac-
cess to applicant pool data. 121 For monitoring purposes, Regu-
lation B requires a creditor to request an applicant's sex, race
(or national origin), marital status, and age only in connection
with a written mortgage loan application for the purchase of
residential real estate and only if the applicant consents to give
such information. 22 The limited scope and quality of this mon-
itoring data prevents the Board from effectively using it to iden-
tify patterns of discrimination as part of its compliance
procedures. 2 3
Despite the lack of available information, the Board has iden-
tified and prohibited a narrow group of practices likely to have
a disparate impact on protected groups, such as the use of
statistics relating to the likelihood of bearing or rearing chil-
dren, 24 the consideration of the existence of a telephone listing
in the name of an applicant, 125 and the discounting or exclusion
from consideration of an applicant's income because such in-
come is derived from part-time employment, an annuity, a pen-
sion, or other retirement benefits. 26 Beyond these isolated pro-
hibitions lie a host of questionable criteria used by creditors' 27
that the Board, as primary public proponent of the Act, should
challenge on the basis of disparate impact. Because of the gen-
ment, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,500 (1981); Supervisory Enforcement Policy for the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act, released by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (1981) (on file with HARV. J. ON LEGIS.).
121 See supra notes 76-99 and accompanying text. Such access however, will not
provide ammunition against some practices, such as subtle prescreening through ad-
vertisements. See also Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 371, 438-42 (1978) (prescreening in credit scoring context may be
discriminatory).
121 12 C.F.R. § 202.13 (1983).
123 The Board has indicated that at present it does not plan to expand the detail or
scope of the Regulation B monitoring information. Statements to Congress, 64 Fed.
Res, Bull. 742, 743 (1978); Statements to Congress, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 20, 26-27 (1980).
114 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(3) (1983). See also Anderson v. United Finance Corp., 666
F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982) (spousal signature).
125 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(4) (1983).
126 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(5) (1983). This provision allows a creditor to consider the
probable continuance of such income. See also Geary, Annual Survey of Consumer
Financial Services Law Developments, Equal Credit Opportunity, 38 Bus. LAW. 1287
(1983).
127 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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eral unavailability of data and the significant costs of obtaining
it, the Board has decided that "in the credit arena.., the effects
test will remain largely a matter for the courts to apply.' l2 8
B. Federal Trade Commission
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act delegates overall enforce-
ment authority to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), except
where other agencies are specifically required by the Act to
oversee certain groups of creditors. 129 This residual authority
includes the major credit card companies, department stores,
some credit unions and sales finance companies. The FTC has
the opportunity to be a major factor in ECOA enforcement.
That promise remains unfulfilled. Since the Act's enactment,
the FTC has proclaimed that its limited resources have pre-
vented it from effectively policing creditor actions. 30 Unlike the
Federal Reserve Board, the FTC has no program for the periodic
examination of individual creditors, and cannot have such a
program without extensive restructuring.13' Investigation of con-
sumer complaints and sporadic special industry investigations
form the bulwark of the limited FTC program.1 32
FTC enforcement activities have been minimal. In 1977 the
FTC announced "an industrywide investigation of compliance
with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by mortgage lending and
credit card companies.' 1 33 Over the next three years a total of
only seven consent orders or judgments were entered.134 In 1981
and 1982, FTC enforcement of ECOA was virtually nonexistent,
resulting in criticism from one of its own members and a promise
by its chairman of increased enforcement activity. 13 5 No signif-
icant increase, however, has occurred to date. 3 6
"2 Statements to Congress, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 20, 24 (1980).
129 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(c) (1982).
13o 1975 Hearings, supra note 20, at 218 (statement of Sheldon Feldman, Asst. Director
for Special Statutes, Fed. Trade Comm'n).
"I Complying with Consumer Credit Regulations: A Challenge, 63 Fed. Res. Bull.
769, 772 (1977).
132 1981 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 154-55.
3 1977 FTC ANN. REP. 19.
134 1978 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 298; 1979 FTC ANN. REP. 7, 37-38; 1980 FTC
ANN. REP. 3, 30, 47-49.
'31 See Capitol Reports, Inc., Issues Summary 1982, WASHINGTON CREDIT LETrER,
Dec. 20, 1982, at 6-7 (available from Capitol Reports, Inc., Suite 1107, 1750 Pennsyl-
vania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006).
136 See 1982 FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 156.
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C. United States Attorney General
The Attorney General's role in ECOA enforcement is twofold.
First, civil actions can be commenced based on referrals made
by the other agencies responsible for compliance. 137 Second, the
Attorney General can initiate proceedings based on a belief that
a creditor is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination. 38
Not surprisingly, given the lethargic enforcement activities of
other agencies and their emphasis on voluntary compliance,
there has been only one referral to date to the Attorney General
by another federal agency. 39 Self-initiated actions, therefore,
have been the sole focus of Justice Department enforcement.
The Attorney General receives slightly over a hundred con-
sumer complaints annually, each of which is investigated. 40
Each year several actions have been instituted alleging wide-
spread discrimination by creditors, but it was not until the spring
of 1982 that one of these actions was tried on the merits. 141
Any expectation that the Department of Justice might assume
a broader role in ECOA enforcement has been quashed by two
developments, one self imposed and one judicially imposed. In
his 1980 Annual Report, the Attorney General recognized the
sharp contrast between the small number of private suits and
the findings of numerous ECOA violations during routine ex-
aminations by the various federal administrative enforcement
agencies. 142 The following year the Attorney General attempted
to develop new procedures, relying on statistical studies, to
trigger investigations and identify creditor practices that had a
broad impact on consumers. 143 The experiment was unsuccess-
ful, however, and the 1982 Report stated that the "Civil Rights
Division does not plan to devote significant resources to this
117 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g) (1982).
138 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (1982).
139 See United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Civ. Action. No. 79-1412 (D. D.C.,
consent decree filed May 29, 1979); 1982 ATT'Y GEN. REP. TO CONGRESS PURSUANT
TO THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976, at 1 (January 28,
1983). [hereinafter cited as ATT'y GEN. REP. 1982] The Annual Reports for prior years
also reflect an absence of referrals.
140 ATT'Y GEN. REP. 1982, supra note 139, at 1. (115 Complaints received).
"I' Id. at 2. See also United States v. American Future Systems, Inc., 571 F.Supp.
551 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
,12 1980 ATT'y GEN. REP. TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPOR-
TUNITY AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1976 at 3.
143 1981 Ar'Y GEN. REP. TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPOR-
TUNITY ACT'S AMENDMENTS OF 1976 at 3.
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approach in the future." 144 The hope that public resources could
be used to develop creditor applicant pool data and to overcome
Regulation B's built-in inhibitions of private disparate impact
suits thus died.
Equally important was the Third Circuit's summary affirm-
ance of the district court decision in United States v. Beneficial
Corp. 14 5 At issue was the Act's mandate to the Attorney General
to pursue civil litigation "for such relief as may be appropriate,
including injunctive relief."'1 46 The Attorney General argued that
this phrase should be construed to allow for money damages for
private individuals injured by the creditor's actions. Despite the
District Court's recognition that it may be "unlikely because of
the size of the claims involved and the difficulty in proving same
that there will be such actions by individual claimants or class
actions representing such plaintiffs,' 47 summary judgment for
defendants was granted on this issue. In the absence of specific
congressional authorization, the Attorney General could not use
government resources to enforce ECOA to recover monetary
relief for injured individuals. The summary action of the Third
Circuit seems to have put the final hope for effective public
enforcement and relief to rest.
V. FACING THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN THE SECOND
DECADE
Credit discrimination against individuals on the basis of age,
race, sex, religion and other factors did not gain widespread
attention until the early 1970's. In 1972 the National Commission
on Consumer Finance issued a report that concluded that "wide-
spread instances of unwarranted discrimination in the granting
of credit to women" existed. 48 Despite substantial evidence of
pervasive discrimination, 149 the Commission did not recommend
144 ATT'y GEN. REP. 1982, supra note 139, at 3.
145 673 F.2d 1302 (3d Cir. 1981), aff'g 492 F. Supp. 682 (D. N.J. 1980).
146 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (1982).
147 United States v. Beneficial Corp., 492 F.Supp. 682, 688 (D. N.J. 1980). See also
United States v. Long, 537 F.2d 1151 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976)
(Att'y Gen'l has no authority to seek money damages other than restitution under Fair
Housing Act).
148 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 160 (1972).
149 For example, the Commission heard testimony that revealed problems in the
following areas: (1) Single women have more trouble than single men in obtaining credit;
(2) Creditors generally require a woman upon marriage to reapply for credit, usually in
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legislation to prohibit credit discrimination because it preferred
private competition to public regulation.150
Nonetheless, two congressional committees investigated the
area; one report identified thirteen specific discriminatory prac-
tices used against women alone.' 5t These investigations
prompted enactment of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Suits
brought under the ECOA, however, have focused on procedural
rather than substantive violations of the Act. This focus has
hidden several fundamental questions that the courts have yet
to address under the ECOA.
Putting aside the issue of intentional credit discrimination,1 52
the nature of the creditor's past experiences determines an ap-
her husband's name; (3) Creditors are unwilling to extend credit to a married woman
in her own name; (4) Creditors are often unwilling to consider the wife's income when
a married couple applies for credit; (5) Women who are divorced or widowed have
trouble reestablishing credit. Women who are separated have a particularly difficult
time, because the accounts may still be in their husband's name. Id. at 152-53.
,50 Id. at xxiii, 160.
(1) Single women have more trouble than single men in obtaining credit.
(2) Creditors generally require a woman upon marriage to reapply for credit,
usually in her husband's name.
(3) Creditors are unwilling to extend credit to a married woman in her own
name.
(4) Creditors are often unwilling to consider the wife's income when a
married couple applies for credit.
(5) Women who are separated have a particularly difficult time, since the
accounts may still be in the husband's name.
(6) Creditors arbitrarily refuse to consider alimony and child support as a
valid source of income when such source is subject to validation.
(7) Creditors apply stricter standards to married applicants where the wife
rather than husband is the primary supporter for the family.
(8) Creditors request or use information concerning birth control practices
in evaluating a credit application.
(9) Creditors request or use information concerning the creditworthiness of
a spouse where an otherwise creditworthy married person applies for
credit as an individual.
(10) Creditors refuse to issue separate accounts to married persons where
each would be creditworthy if unmarried.
(11) Creditors consider as "dependents" spouses who are employed and not
actually dependent on the applicant.
(12) Creditors use credit scoring systems that apply different values depend-
ing on sex or marital status.
(13) Creditors alter an individual's credit rating on the basis of the credit
rating of the spouse.
Credit Discrimination, 1974: Hearings on H.R. 14856 and H.R. 14908 Before the Sub-
conim. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 17 (1974); Economic Problems of Women: Hearings Before the Joint Economic
Connittee, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
"I See generally Shay, Brandt, & Sexton, Public Regulation of Financial Services:
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act in REGULATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES
208 (A. Heggestad ed., 1981).
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plicant's likelihood of getting credit. 153 The first problem with
this system is inertia. Reaction by creditors to changes in the
composition and creditworthiness of the pool of credit appli-
cants occurs slowly. 154 A presumption exists against certain clas-
sifications that is not easily overcome. 155 While factors such as
occupation, home ownership, or length of time on the job may
be related to creditworthiness, reliance by creditors on such
data may have a disproportionate impact on consumers who
perform certain jobs, who have not owned homes, or who have
been unable to secure long-term employment. The question re-
mains whether it is discriminatory for creditors to use these
secondary characteristics to deny credit to otherwise qualified
applicants.
For example, Regulation B prohibits consideration of the ex-
istence of a telephone listing in the applicant's name, 156 but does
not prohibit consideration of home ownership. Both factors are
probative of creditworthiness and both are significantly corre-
lated to sex, 157 but one is much easier for applicants to change
than the other. The easily modified characteristic, however, is
the one prohibited from consideration. The reverse correlation
between the predictive ability of factual information used in
credit analysis and the ability or inability of an applicant to alter
that information magnifies the effect of historical data on an
applicant's ability to obtain credit.
Neither the ECOA nor the courts have provided clear stan-
dards for halting perpetuation of past discrimination. 158 Any
attempt to totally eradicate the effects of past discriminatory
153 See generally Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 371, 372-77 (1978).
'- See, e.g., D. KAMERSCHEN & E. KLISE, MONEY AND BANKING 513-620 (6th Ed.
1976).
155 This problem is minimized with respect to credit scoring systems because Regu-
lation B requires periodic revalidation of credit scoring systems. 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.2(p)(2)(iv) (1983). See generally Long, Credit Screening System Selection, 11 J.
FINANCIAL & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 363 (1976).
1-56 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(4) (1983).
17 See supra note 15; see also Nevin & Churchill, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
An Evaluation, 43 J. MARKETING, Spring, 1979, at 95, 100 (finding significant correlation
between home ownership and age and marital status).
8SS ee generally Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Forevord: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-36 (1976); Eisenberg, Dispropor-
tionate Impact and the Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitution and Adjudication, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 107, 144-45 (1976); Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96
HARV. L. REV. 829 (1983).
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practices would clearly place a substantial financial burden on
the credit industry.159 The lack of any requirement, however, to
affirmatively modify traditional credit decisionmaking processes
merely perpetuates discrimination. As in other areas, the per-
missible extent of affirmative action programs and their precise
relationship to past discrimination remains unclear.160
Furthermore, the data on which current evaluation systems
and practices are built may be inherently discriminatory. For
example, women and minorities have been underrepresented in
the credit process, and creditors' evaluation systems are there-
fore heavily based on a sample of white, male credit recipients.
Minority and female applicants may be penalized for not pos-
sessing characteristics traditionally identified with white
males. 161
Such a built-in bias not only penalizes applicants who do not
possess such characteristics, but also fails to consider special
characteristics of the members of protected classes that may
make them superior credit risks. Patterns of geographic distri-
bution, economic life styles, and financial practices among some
protected groups may differ from traditional models. 62 These
findings could fundamentally affect our view of equality in credit
determinations.
119 Preventing creditors from considering variables which have a high correlation to
actual creditworthiness, but which have a disproportionate impact on groups of appli-
cants, will increase creditor costs and to some extent decrease fund availability. See,
e.g. Benston, Risk on Consumer Finance Company Personal Loans, 32 J. OF FINANCE
593 (1977); Murphy, Economies of Scale in tire Cost of Compliance with the Consumer
Protection Laws: The Case of Implementation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of
1974, 10 J. OF BANK RESEARCH 248 (1980); Smith, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
of 1974: A CostlBenefit Analysis, 32 J. OF FINANCE 609 (1977).
260 See generally Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (state
statute that excludes males from enrolling in state-supported nursing schools violates
the Equal Protection Clause); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979) (Title VII does not prohibit all race conscious affirmative action plans); Univ. of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (race can be taken into account in admissions
decisions but strict numerical quotas are not allowed). See also Grove City College v.
Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984) (Title IX prohibition on educational discrimination applies
only to individual programs receiving federal aid).
161 See generally Hsia, Credit Scoring and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 371, 389-91, 393-98 (1978); Smith, Measuring Risk in Consumer Install-
ment Credit, 11 MANAGEMENT Sci. 327, 333, 337-38 (1964).
162 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 151-60 (1972); Hearings on S. 483, S. 1900, S. 1927, S. 1961 and H.R.
5616 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 481-526 (1975) (Comptroller of the
Currency, Fair Housing Lending Practices Project); Goulet, Credit Potential of Women,
9 J. CONSUMER CREDIT MANAGEMENT 102, 102-06 (1978). See also Johnson, Does
Credit Scoring Treat Servicemen Fairly?, THE CREDIT WORLD, Oct. 1974, at 25 (iden-
tifying unique credit characteristics of service personnel).
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A study of the accounts of a large metropolitan bank which
issues credit cards based on a credit scoring system is illustra-
tive. 16 Twenty applicant characteristics, ranging from occupa-
tion and income to length of time at current address, were used
in several different credit scoring models. 164 The study showed
that the ability of traditional historical information to predict
creditworthiness varied markedly between males and females.165
The study found that ECOA's prohibition on distinguishing data
on the basis of sex can in fact hurt women because it creates a
presumption that the relationship between risk indicators and
credit performance is identical for men and women. For exam-
ple, with regard to credit references:
If men typically handle financial matters, only one or two
bank references may be an indicator of risk, while for
women, the establishment of even one such relationship may
be indicative of good credit performance .... If women
have on average only two while men have four, but credit
references carry the same weight in determining creditwor-
thiness, the model will understate the creditworthiness of
women in a pooled regression.166
Controlling for such variations, the study found that from 18 to
63 percent more females would be accepted at various identified
levels of acceptable risk.167 Put simply, the "arguments in favor
of separate credit models [for men and women in order to elim-
inate discrimination in credit granting based on sex] are
compelling."' 168
Because the ECOA requires that all equally qualified appli-
cants be treated equally, it is essential to define what "equally
qualified" means. Most credit evaluation systems consider fac-
tors based on a historical data pool that is dominated by white
163 G. CHANDLER AND D. EWERT, DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX UNDER
THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY AcT, (Working Paper No. 8, Credit Research Center,
Purdue Univ. 1976) (on file with HARV. J. ON LEGIS.).
164 Id. at 3, 6.
161 Id. at 9-11.
166 Id. at 8-9. Other results show that "[hiaving a 'retail sales job' is quite common
among female labor force participants and carries relatively little weight, but is appar-
ently highly correlated with unsatisfactory performance for males. Banking relationships
and home ownership also carry relatively higher weights for women than for men. The
presence of these characteristics in the female pool is less frequent than among males,
but they are apparently indicative of good credit performance." Id. at 10.
167 Id. at 15.
163 Id. at 17. The Chandler-Ewert study focused solely on the disparate predictive
effect of traditional variables. Different economic and financial practices may dictate
consideration of totally separate structural models for credit prediction among various
groups. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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males. Given this bias, "equality" in the credit context may not
mean refusing to consider protected characteristics, but may
mean affirmatively recognizing that applicants with certain char-
acteristics may form a select sub-group. Even if not used as a
basis for finding creditor treatment discriminatory, the identifi-
cation of such credit sub-groups can lead to a statutorily sanc-
tioned special purpose credit program of affirmative action. 169
The courts have yet to resolve these difficult issues under the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The questions are not necessarily
insoluble; they simply have not been raised in the credit context.
Absent access by private parties and public agencies to a data
pool presently unavailable under Regulation B, however, such
issues will only be addressed in law reviews.
VI. REFINEMENT OF THE ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK
It is clear from the evidence that the substantive effects of
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act over the past ten years have
differed from original expectations. Consideration of the extent
of society's desire to identify and eliminate credit discrimination
should spur amendment of the Act, Regulation B, or both, and
tougher administrative enforcement.
Initially, Congress should amend the Act to provide for a
statutory minimum damage recovery. Experience with the Truth
in Lending Act's minimum $100 recovery 70 illustrates the de-
sirability of a parallel provision under ECOA, where actual
damages are equally difficult to prove. 171 Moreover, since a
minimum statutory recovery would promote technical accuracy
by creditors in complying with the Act, enforcement of technical
violations could be substantially shifted from administrative
agencies to private parties.172
Revisions of Regulation B could also improve the effective-
ness of the ECOA. The definition of "adverse action" should be
changed to reflect the fact that variation in the terms on which
169 15 U.S.C. § 1691(c)(3) (1982). Development of special purpose credit programs
presumes the ability to analyze the data necessary for special program design. Under
the present regulation, however, such data is unavailable. See supra notes 76-99 and
accompanying text. See also United States v. American Future Systems, Inc., 571 F.
Supp. 551 (E.D, Pa. 1983) (special purpose credit program which made distinctions
based upon race, marital status, and other prohibited bases violated ECOA).
170 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) (1982).
171 See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1983)
(plaintiff entitled to damages under Truth in Lending Act even though no actual injuries
were sustained).
172 See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
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credit is granted may be an indication of illegal discrimination. 173
This would make applicants and creditors more conscious of
the possibility of this form of illegal discrimination.
Regulation B must also be revised to require creditors to
collect data relating to applicant characteristics which identify
applicants as members of protected classes. The tension here is
clear. Prohibition of the collection of data relating to these char-
acteristics furthers the appearance of neutrality and avoids false
issues of discrimination. 174 As discussed earlier, however, this
prohibited information often is available to creditors either di-
rectly or through highly-correlated proxy variables. 175 The avail-
ability of data concerning protected applicants is essential to
challenge credit discrimination in many of these situations.1 76
Collection of this data is needed both for adequate effects test
enforcement and for special purpose affirmative action programs
to benefit groups who have been historically discriminated
against or who may be better credit risks than the white male
credit majority.
Implementing these changes alone will not lead to the elimi-
nation of credit discrimination. These amendments, however,
would create a statutory and regulatory framework that would
promote better compliance by creditors and enhance enforce-
ment efforts by both public agencies and private parties. An
accompanying shift in focus from procedural compliance to sub-
stantive violation would emphasize the ECOA's unique role
among consumer protection legislation as an antidiscrimination
statute and raise issues of substantive discrimination previously
unaddressed by the courts.
173 See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
'74 An applicant who is requested to supply information relating to protected charac-
teristics may feel discriminated against by the very request for such information. Some
lessening of this reaction may be accomplished by prefacing such requests with the
statement that "recording of the following information is required pursuant to the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B."
175 See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
176 The Board recognized the practical difficulties in proving discrimination but main-
tained the information bars despite consumer requests that they be eliminated:
When the earlier version of Regulation B was being drafted, feminist groups
fought hard for a provision banning questions about an applicant's sex or
marital status on application forms. They believed that keeping this information
from creditors would reduce discrimination against women. Such a ban also
was viewed as a way of re-educating those who still though that these factors
were crucial to the credit decision. But a year later these same groups were
supporting civil rights groups in calling for a provision in Regulation B requiring
creditors to ask the sex and race of applicants for credit. This change was
based on the realization that these data constituted an important enforcement
tool.
Equal Credit Opportunity, 63 Fed. Res. Bull. 101, 103 (Feb. 1977).
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